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ABSTRACT
We analyze the behavior of game-show contestants who play a one-shot game called Friend or Foe.
While it is a weakly dominant strategy not to cooperate, almost half the contestants on the show
choose to play "friend." Remarkably, the behavior of contestants remains unchanged even when
stakes are very high, ranging from $200 to more than $10,000. We conclude that the frequent
cooperation observed in one-shot social dilemma games is not an artefact of the low stakes typically
used in laboratory experiments. Strategic decisions on Friend or Foe change markedly if players can
observe previous episodes. We show that these contestants play "friend" if they have reason to
expect their opponent to play "friend," and they play "foe" otherwise. The observed decisions are
consistent with recent fairness theories that characterize individuals as conditional cooperators.
Using information about past play, some groups (e.g., pairs of women) manage to stabilize
cooperation in this high-stakes environment. For most others, improved coordination implies a
drastic decline in monetary winnings. Prior to playing the social dilemma game, contestants
"produce" their endowment by answering trivia questions. We find some evidence for reciprocal
behavior: Players who produce fewer correct answers for their team are more likely to cooperate in
the social dilemma game.
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Harvard Business School Public Policy and Management












IV.  Introduction 
In June 2002, the Game Show Network began airing a cable television show in which 
contestants play a high-stakes, one-shot game called Friend or Foe.
1  In this game, each of two 
players simultaneously chooses whether to play Friend or Foe.  Each player’s payoff depends on 
the action chosen by the other contestant in the following way: 
Figure 1 
    Player 2 
    Friend  Foe 
Friend  (x/2, x/2)  (0, x)  Player 1 
Foe  (x, 0)  (0, 0) 
This game is a variant of the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, and is similar in structure to 
games analyzed previously in experimental studies.
2   Here playing “foe” is a weakly-dominant 
strategy for each player.  In contrast to the prior literature, however, the stakes in Friend or Foe are 
quite high.
3  The payoff x varies between $200 and $16,400, with an average of $2,800 at stake per 
game.  In 315 games, the 630 contestants take home over $700,000.   
The data from Friend or Foe reveal two striking facts about play.  First, individuals choose 
“friend” at a remarkably high rate, even at very high stakes.  The fraction of players choosing 
“friend” when the stakes are under $3,000 is 55 percent, and it is 54 percent when the stakes exceed 
$3000 and 55 percent when the stakes exceed $5,000.  Second, the fraction of games with split 
outcomes—when one player chooses “friend” and the other “foe”—declines substantially over the 
                                                 
1 We are not the first to use data generated by television game shows.  Gertner (1993) examines attitudes toward risk on 
Card Sharks, Metrick (1995) studies betting behavior on Jeopardy!, and Berk, Hughston, and Vandevande (1996) 
examine learning and bounded rationality on The Price is Right.  Nor are we the first to analyze play on Friend or Foe.  
List (2003) uses data on the first 40 episodes to draw inferences about discrimination. 
2 Social dilemma games are among the most commonly studied experimental situations (for surveys, see Ledyard, 1995 
and Laury and Holt, forthcoming). 
3 For reasons of cost, most high-stakes experiments have been undertaken in low-income countries.  The evidence in 
this paper is (to our knowledge) the first to study subjects from an advanced Western economy play such a high-stakes 
one-shot game (for a survey on the role of stakes, see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).   2
course of the show.  That is, players evidently learn to “coordinate” on outcomes along the main 
diagonal of the payoff matrix above, despite the simultaneous-move nature of the game.  Moreover, 
these outcomes become correlated with players’ observable characteristics (e.g., gender, race, and 
age) over time. 
A third interesting feature arises because the show’s payoff stakes x is determined in pre-
game play by the pairs’ answers to trivia questions.  The relative productivity of the two players is 
predictive of whether each chooses to share (i.e., play “friend”) or steal (play “foe”) the fruit of 
their efforts, at rates which are again stakes-invariant. 
This paper documents these features of play, providing reinforcement for some prior 
theories of behavior but pointing to gaps in the literature with respect to other empirical 
regularities.  The observation that individuals play “friend” at a high rate is consistent with various 
empirical results from laboratory experiments.  These findings can be rationalized by supposing 
that at least some players care about the fairness of outcomes in this game (Rabin, 1993).  Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) argue that individuals have preferences over outcomes that depend in part on the 
difference in monetary payoffs between players, and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) indicate that 
individuals dislike taking a disproportional share of the winnings.  Nevertheless, in previous papers 
a number of authors expressed a concern that the findings from laboratory studies with fairly small 
stakes would not generalize to contexts with larger economic consequences (Binswanger,1980; 
Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva, 1995; Cameron, 1995; Slonim 
and Roth, 1998).
4  The results from Friend or Foe allay some concerns about generalizablity.  The 
overwhelming evidence from this game is that players’ cooperative tendencies are remarkably 
stakes invariant.   
                                                 
4 Moreover, the literature has expressed concerns that experiments performed in relatively poor countries to simulate 
high stakes might not be generalizable to Western economies, given substantial uncontrolled differences in cultural 
norms (see Roth et. al., 1991).   3
The second fact about play is less readily explained with the existing literature on behavior 
in games.  Our evidence on this point is derived from a useful feature of the production history of 
the show.  The show was filmed in two “seasons,” with the first 40 episodes produced before the 
show’s on-air debut in June 2002.  The remaining 65 episodes were taped in late summer 2002, 
after the airing of the first season.  Players on the first season therefore had little show-related basis 
for forming beliefs about opponent play, while players in the second season could observe the play 
of 240 prior contestants.  That is, Friend or Foe is an intergenerational game with a sequence of 
non-overlapping “generations” of players.  In many experiments, players learn through personal 
experience by repeatedly playing the same game.  Friend or Foe is an example of social learning, 
where contestants learn by observing the decisions of other contestants, as in Schotter and Sopher 
(2003).  While these authors find that relying on history alone does not allow players to coordinate 
their actions, we find strong evidence that players learn to coordinate on symmetric “friend-friend” 
or “foe-foe” outcomes.  The evidence is particularly strong for pairs of players with common 
observable characteristics; among pairs of women, for example, the fraction of games with split 
outcomes falls from 58 percent in the first season (N=26) to 40 percent (N=40) in the second 
season. 
This observation raises two questions:  How do later generations of players manage to 
achieve symmetric outcomes, and why do they prefer to do this?  A tantalizing piece of evidence on 
the former is that during the first season, a player’s choice in the game is statistically independent 
of his or her opponent’s, but this choice is correlated with the player’s observable characteristics 
such as age, race and gender.  In the second season play depends on upon both the individual’s and 
his or her opponents’ observable characteristics.  This suggests that later generations of players 
have learned to condition their strategies on their opponents’ observable characteristics.     4
Explaining why play would evolve toward this behavior – when “foe” is always a weakly 
dominant strategy in monetary terms – requires appeal to both theories of fairness and “social” 
(intergenerational) learning.  Building on the literature, we suggest that some fraction of the 
population are “conditional cooperators” who prefer to play “friend” as a best response to an 
opponent playing “friend,” but prefer “foe” against “foe.”  The rest of the population may have 
less-intense preferences regarding fairness, electing “foe” regardless.  If these unobservable aspects 
of preferences are correlated during early rounds of the game with players’ observable 
characteristics, then updating by conditional cooperators after the first season would explain the 
evolution of intergenerational play observed in the data.   
This explanation has two noteworthy implications.  The first is how powerful preferences 
for “fair” outcomes must be, given the evidence from Friend or Foe.  Specifically, because of the 
high stakes for which Friend or Foe is played, the implied money-metric value of a “fair” (i.e., 
cooperative) outcome must be quite large for conditional cooperators – on the order of hundreds or 
thousands of dollars in this simple game.  The second implication is that players with demographic 
attributes associated with conditionally-cooperative preferences will come to fare better 
(monetarily) over time, relative to players without observable characteristics initially associated 
with cooperation.  In the data, changes in take-home winnings over time are consistent with this 
prediction.  In essence players ‘stereotyped’ by observable characteristics associated with 
uncooperative play in early generations do progressively worse monetarily, as opponents become 
likely to play foe against them. 
The final feature of Friend or Foe we examine arises because players determine the stakes 
of the game by initially answering trivia questions.  Before playing the game shown in Figure 1, 
pairs of players answer up to 18 questions.  For each pair, the number of right answers determines   5
the game’s stakes, x.  We directly observe how each pair comes to choose a particular answer, 
allowing us to record the number of correct and incorrect answers for which each player is 
responsible.  We use this information to examine theories of equity and reciprocity in subsequent 
(non-cooperative) play.  For example, if a player’s partner has contributed a larger number of 
correct answers, does the player show “gratitude” with a greater tendency to play “friend”?  The 
answer is affirmative, at least for the first season.  Contestants who make smaller contributions than 
their partners are more likely to play “friend.”  Interestingly, this effect disappears in the second 
season, and is quite insensitive to the monetary payoffs at stake. 
The paper proceeds in four sections.  Section 2 describes the game context that generates 
the data.  Section 3 discusses the theoretical background with reference to the relevant literature.  
Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 presents the results with respect to stakes, learning and 
coordination, and pre-game contribution activity. 
 
V.  The Quasi-Experimental Context 
A.  The Game 
Friend or Foe is a television game show that was aired on the Game Show Network 
beginning June 3
rd, 2002.  The game has two components, a production phase, in which player 
pairs jointly contribute to answering questions, and a distribution phase, in which contestants play 
a social dilemma game to determine how the pie they have produced will be divided.  The Game 
Show Network (2003) provides the following description of the game: 
“The show consists of six strangers who pair up at the start of the show to form three teams of two.  Each team 
is separated into isolation chambers where all trivia rounds will be played.  The newly formed teams have to 
work together and agree on answers to trivia questions, in order to build a bank account.  At the end of each 
round (there are 3 rounds total) the lowest scoring team is eliminated.  Before the team is dismissed, they enter 
the "Trust Box" where they decide how their winnings up to that point are divided.”   6
The first round has four trivia questions, worth $500 each.  The second round has four 
questions worth $1000 each.  In the third round, the remaining team answers up to ten $500 “right 
or wrong” questions.   If the third-round team answers all ten questions correctly within 60 
seconds, their entire score is doubled.  The winnings to be divided can therefore range between 
$200 and $22,000.  Some trivia questions are “absurdly easy” (TV Guide Online, 2003), many 
others are impossible to know.
5  For each question in rounds 1 and 2, the host provides four 
possible answers.  The two players in a team need to agree on an answer before they can respond.  
The show airs the pair trying to arrive at consensus, and it is generally possible to observe which of 
the pair first suggested the answer they ultimately choose.  By coding this information for every 
question, we can determine the total number of positive and negative contributions that each 
contestant makes to her team’s score.  After each round, the lowest-scoring team plays the game in 
Figure 1 to decide how the money in their account is to be split, then exits the show.
6 
The show, which was taped in Santa Monica, CA, aired in two “seasons.”  The first season 
consisted of 40 episodes taped prior to the show’s on-air premiere on June 3, 2002.   These 
episodes aired twice daily on weekdays (at 4 and 10pm), then rerun on weekends.  A second season 
of 65 new episodes was taped in late summer 2002.  These were aired beginning October 1, 2002.  
Contestants on the show during the second season therefore can have seen the play from the first 
season, while contestants during the first season could not have seen any episodes on television 
prior to taping.
7 
                                                 
5 A typical example for the latter category is: “According to a Blockbuster survey, which celebrity do people most want 
to clone: Britney Spears, Sharon Stone, Brad Pitt, or John Travolta?”  (Answer: Britney Spears). 
6 Daniel R. Coleridge, writing in TV Guide Online, June 3, 2002, describes this part of the show as follows: “Friend or 
Foe’s rather Satanic premise has contestant duos answer questions, then pits them against each other in a nasty mind 
game: Can they trust each other to split their jackpot equally, or will one lie and steal all the cash from the other?” 
7 There were a few minor changes in the show between the first and second seasons.  During the first season each team 
was given $200 for their account prior to the start of the game (so that a team answering no questions correctly would 
have something to split).   The top possible score in the first season is $22,200.  In the second season the show started   7
Partner assignment is not random; instead, selection worked as follows (again, according to 
show producers): 
 “Prior to the taping of each episode the six game players will be gathered together backstage.  There, the three 
contestants and the three potential players will be introduced to one another via a producer.  The producer will 
first expose the three contestants’ positive and negative attributes.  Once all of the contestant's information has 
been shared, the producer will then disclose all three potential partners’ positive and negative attributes. After 
each potential partner has been introduced, the producer will ask the three contestants to select one person 
they would like to partner with.  These choices, made in security, will be written down and then displayed one 
by one.  If all three have selected different partners, the producer will identify each team as official partners.  
If two or even three contestants have selected the same partner, then the choice falls to this selected partner. 
After the selected partner has chosen, the remaining contestants select their second choice partner.  This 
process will continue until three teams of two have been formed.”
8 
 
B.  TV Shows and Laboratory Experiments 
Our context has some clear advantages and disadvantages.  The first and foremost 
advantage is that Friend or Foe allows us to observe decisions in a social dilemma situation with 
very high stakes.  Balanced against this advantage are a few features that distinguish our context 
from standard laboratory experiments. 
The game show differs from many experiments in that players interact in person.  While 
face-to-face one-shot interaction is not obviously less realistic than double-blind exchanges – many 
business and social situations constitute one-shot games where people countenance their opponents 
                                                                                                                                                                 
teams with nothing but gave teams answering no questions correctly $200 to split in the dilemma game.  The top 
possible score in the second season is $22,000. 
8 Producer Melissa Rudman, email communication with authors, April 8, 2003.   During the first season the show aired 
the partner selection process, while this part was not aired during the second season.  Hence, one cannot know whether 
partners chose each other in the latter 65 episodes. 
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– personal interactions reduce the degree of control in the experiment because it is difficult to 
empirically assess whether looks, hugs, and smiles influence the observed strategic decisions.  
Second, our contestants play on a televised show where play is not anonymous.  While it is 
unlikely that acquaintances of the contestants happen to see the show by accident – only 0.6 
percent of cable television households watch Friend or Foe (Greco, 2002) – it is possible that some 
players informed friends or family that they would be on TV.  While this visibility diverges from 
standard laboratory experiments, we do not view it as clearly bad.  In real life, only very rarefied 
examples of one-shot interaction have no chance of being observed by third parties. 
These issues aside, our context has two challenges.  The first challenge is that events in the 
production phase of the game may affect behavior in the distribution phase.  Contestants’ “friend” 
or “foe” decisions may be affected by their relative contributions to their teams’ score.  For 
example, contestants contributing less to the kitty may feel gratitude and may be more likely to 
play friend.  Our strategy for dealing with this is to examine whether players’ choices in the Friend 
or Foe game in Figure 1 are robust to players’ contributions during the production phase.  We 
examine this issue directly in section IV.C. 
A related concern is that the size of the stakes is correlated with the history of the 
production phase.  More successful teams who play for higher stakes have a longer “production” 
history, and they get to observe the strategic decisions of the less successful contestants.  Our 
approach for dealing with this problem is to analyze the relationship between stakes and the foe 
tendency both within and between rounds of the game.   
Finally, as with subjects in most controlled experiments, our subjects are not a random 
sample of the general population, which may affect our ability to generalize our results. 
   9
III.  Theoretical Issues Associated with the Game 
The distribution phase of Friend or Foe is the simple game in Figure 1.  In this game, 
playing “foe” is a weakly dominant strategy.  Only if a player believes his or her opponent will 
play “foe” with probability one is it even rational for an income-maximizing contestant to play 
“friend.”  Given the frequency of friendly play—over the course of the show 45% of contestants 
choose “friend” —the belief that a partner will play “foe” for certain seems implausible.  
Furthermore, because of the simplicity of the payoff structure it strains credulity to think that 
cognitive shortcomings kept contestants from choosing “foe.”  Similarly, repeated interaction 
cannot explain cooperative behavior as it is common knowledge that contestants play a one-shot 
game. 
A more promising avenue for understanding the behavior on the show is to consider 
additional ‘fairness’ payoffs not captured in Figure 1.  Rabin (1993) argues that people want to be 
nice to those who treat them fairly, and they want to punish those who hurt them.  The fairness of 
actions depends on the players’ intentions, which can be inferred from the distribution of payoffs 
that these actions induce.  One implication of Rabin’s theory is that contestants who expect their 
opponents to choose “foe” prefer to punish their partner by destroying the entire endowment.  
There is much evidence on Friend or Foe that supports this view.  The “friend”-playing partner in a 
“friend-foe” or “foe-friend” pair often displays sadness or anger.  Insults are common, and “friend” 
players’ remarks sometimes need to be bleeped over.  In the context of a public good game, Fehr 
and Gächter (2000) provide systematic evidence showing that people are willing to punish those 
who do not cooperate, even if punishment is costly. 
While Rabin’s (1993) model builds on players’ intentions, other fairness theories assume 
that relative material payoffs directly enter the utility functions of individuals.  In their theory of   10
equity, reciprocity and competition, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) posit that a player’s relative 
share of the total pecuniary payout affects utility.  An alternative model is due to Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), who argue that it is the difference between players’ payoffs that is relevant.  While these 
fairness theories differ in their specific assumptions and predictions, they all assume that the 
complete payoff matrix includes both monetary and non-monetary considerations of the following 
form: 
Figure 2 
    Player j 
    Friend  Foe 
Friend  (x/2, x/2)  (-Si, x-Gj)  Player i 
Foe  (x-Gi, -Sj)  (0, 0) 
 
The term Si > 0, for sucker’s dismay, motivates a player to destroy the entire endowment if 
he or she believes the opponent will try to grab the entire pie.  The term Gi, or guilt, captures 
feelings of guilt or shame for having played “foe” when the partner played “friend.”  On the show, 
this type of embarrassment is frequently observed.  Many apologize for having chosen “foe” when 
the other contestant was friendly.  Some explain they really needed the money, while others say 
they chose “foe” only because they thought–incorrectly–that the other player would choose “foe.”   
The non-monetary terms in this augmented game, Si and Gi, reflect unobservable 
preferences.  We assume that these attributes vary across players.  Strategies in this augmented 
game then depend on these values in the following way.  If pi denotes player i’s belief that his or 
her opponent will play “foe,” then player i prefers to play “friend” if and only if  
Gi – Si · ? i   >   x / 2   11
where ? i = pi / (1-pi).  That is, a player chooses “friend” if her guilt from stealing the entire pie 
exceeds x/2 by a multiple of her sucker’s dismay should her opponent do so; the potential dismay 
weighs more heavily in the decision as the prior on an opponent playing “foe” becomes larger. 
In this setting, it is useful to distinguish between two ‘types’ of players.  Given a game at 
stakes x, players with Gi > x / 2 are conditional cooperators.  For such types there exists a set of 
beliefs about the likelihood of an opponent choosing “foe” for which it is optimal to also play 
“foe.”  Below a critical threshold of pi, however, i will choose “friend.”  That is, a conditional 
cooperator prefers to play “friend” against an opponent she believes is (sufficiently) likely to also 
play “friend,” but prefers to meet “foe” with “foe” to avoid sucker’s dismay.  The other type of 
player that it is useful to distinguish here has Gi < x / 2, or a lower level of guilt from taking the 
entire pie than a conditional cooperator would have.  Such players have a dominant strategy of 
playing “foe” in the augmented game, assuming all players have a positive value of Si (that is, no 
one likes being played the sucker to at least some degree). 
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting what conditionally cooperative types have at 
stake empirically in Friend or Foe.  Although Gi and Si are not observable directly, informative 
bounds on the former can be inferred for a sizeable share of the population based on observed play.  
Overall, approximately 45% of players choose “friend;” for these players, the median stakes x is 
$2700.  Thus for nearly half of the 630 players, the money-metric “cost” of playing “foe” against a 
possibly “friend”-playing partner—a cost we interpret as guilt or shame—must be upwards of 
$1,350.  This strikes us as a remarkably large sum, especially given the truly end-game nature of 
players’ Friend or Foe dilemma and their quite brief pre-game interactions as show contestants.  
There is, however, no way around the facts of how people play for the stakes in the data or the 
structure of the game.  Since the magnitude of this lower bound on Gi (for half the players) does not   12
depend on the players’ (unknown) prior beliefs, we infer that such ‘fairness’ considerations must be 
quite powerful even in one-shot social interactions. 
 
A.  Learning and Coordination 
Fairness theories posit that some individuals—but not everyone—reward friendly behavior 
with cooperative play.  In Friend or Foe, one can extend the inference that Gi exceeds thousands of 
dollars for many people to the supposition that players may have a high level of motivation to 
discern attributes of opponents that correlate with these unobserved aspects of preferences.  In 
Season 1, players have little game-related experience to form beliefs about opponents’ play.  In 
contrast, players in Season 2 can use Season 1 outcomes to update beliefs about pi.  For example, if 
older people in Season 1 were observed to play “friend” at higher-than-average rates—as we will 
see was the case—then one might infer that fairness considerations of the sort described above are 
greater for older players. 
More generally, we postulate that players’ unobservable preferences over the fairness of 
outcomes may be correlated with players’ observable attributes.  Such correlations might then be 
deduced by later generations of players from observation of earlier players’ actions.  Although it is 
not essential to our argument, it is reasonable to expect Season 1 players to approach the game with 
(comparatively) uninformed priors over opponents’ play; we know they had little show-related 
basis for forming such priors given the show’s production history.  If so, then during Season 1 only 
players with exceptionally large values of Gi would choose “friend.”  Over time, however, the 
relative frequency of “friend” play can be determined for different groups of people based upon 
their observable (and non-imitable) characteristics.  Since Season 2 players had access to all   13
(potentially) of the results of Season 1’s play, it is natural for the later players to update 
accordingly. 
To see how learning will affect outcomes, imagine two contexts in which players know 
nothing and everything, respectively, about whether their opponents are conditional cooperators.  
In each case, suppose it is common knowledge that 50 percent of individuals are conditional 
cooperators that prefer to play “friend” with a prior of p=0.5, while the other 50 percent are 
“money players” who care only about monetary payoffs.  In the case without further information, 
we would expect the individual foe rate to be 50 percent, half of the games to end in off-diagonal 
(split) outcomes, and a quarter each to end with “friend-friend” and “foe-foe” outcomes. 
How do outcomes change when players can perfectly predict an opponent’s type?   Then 
three-quarters of pairings should end “foe-foe,” while the remaining quarter is “friend-friend.”  
Half of the time, conditional cooperators are paired with money players, and in those cases both 
play “foe.”  In the quarter of cases when money players face money players, both play “foe.”  Only 
in the remaining quarter of cases when conditional cooperators face other conditional cooperators 
does either party wish to play friend.  Greater player knowledge thus has two effects.  First, it raises 
the individual foe rate, in this case from 50 to 75 percent.  Second, it also increases the degree of 
coordination, or situations in which both players choose the same action and avoid asymmetric 
outcomes. 
In reality – and presumably in the data as well – players cannot perfectly predict opponent 
types, but in Season 2 they have more information than in Season 1.  Then a player can update his 
or her prior over an opponent’s play (correctly) based on observable characteristics, and we should 
see greater ‘coordination’ –  i.e. more play that avoids the non-monetary costs of asymmetric 
“friend-foe” outcomes.  Consider an interaction of two persons whose observable characteristics   14
are similar to earlier players that typically chose “friend.”  Each player might expect his or her 
opponent to care about the fairness of outcomes because of the correlation observed among earlier 
players.  For our purposes it does not matter whether such players individually update toward a 
high opponent Gj, a low “foe” prior value of pi, or both; either way, the implication is that both 
players are more likely to play “friend” than if either faced a player whose observable 
characteristics were not historically correlated with “friendly” play.  We would similarly expect a 
pairing of two players with observable characteristics that predicted uncooperative behavior in the 
first season to yield increasingly high “foe-foe” rates in the second season, as players update away 
from the possibility of high Gj‘s and ensuing friendly play. 
Among conditional cooperators, uncooperative behavior is contagious (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999).  When a sufficiently high fraction of persons does not care about fairness, increases in 
“foe”-playing behavior over time emerges as a positive prediction.  Social learning—that is, 
updating by later generations based on the correlation of historical play with players’ observable 
characteristics—has the implication that player behavior should depend on both own and opponent 
characteristics in the second season. 
 
B.  Gratitude vs. Resentment 
Fairness theories rely on a reference outcome to describe ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ distributions.  In 
many laboratory experiments, an equal split appears to be a natural reference point.  Subjects do 
not know each other, they are most often students at the same university, and their roles in the 
experiments are randomly assigned.  On Friend or Foe, however, players can contribute differently 
to their teams’ success.  For example, if one team member contributes many correct answers while 
the other contributes few, the former player has, in effect, made a large gift to the joint kitty.  A   15
large body of experimental work in psychology and economics asks how recipients respond to 
gifts, and in particular whether they reciprocate.  In our context this question reduces to the 
following:  Does the player who contributes fewer answers show gratitude by playing “friend,” or 
does she show resentment by playing “foe”? 
 
IV.  Data 
 
A total of 105 Friend or Foe episodes were produced, with 6 players on each episode, for a 
total of 630 individual contestants in 315 game pairs.  For each contestant we observe gender, age, 
occupation, race, her team’s score (the value of x in Figures 1 and 2, or the “stakes”), number of 
positive and negative contributions to her team’s score (i.e. correct and incorrect answers she 
contributes), and the amount she – individually – takes home (the “take”). 
Our data come from two sources.  First, incomplete data on all 105 episodes – episode 
airdate, player names, “friend” or foe decision, and each player’s take – were obtained via the 
web.
9  Player name generally allows inference about gender, so the gender variable is available for 
621 observations.  The stakes were unavailable at this source for cases where pairs played “foe-
foe” (and therefore the takes were 0).  Second, we obtained complete data on 100 episodes  - and 
600 players – by taping and coding outcomes and player date directly from the tapes.    
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of the sample.  About half of the contestants are male, 
and nearly a sixth of the contestants are black (nearly one per episode).  Players tend to be young 
adults: the median contestant age is 27.  The 25
th and 75
th percentile age players are 23 and 33, 
respectively.  Dividing the players’ hometowns into four Census divisions and “foreign,” about half 
                                                 
9 http://gameshowfavorites.classictvfavorites.com/FriendorFoe/episodeguide.html (accessed May 8, 2003)   16
of players are from the West, 17 percent are from the Midwest, about 15 percent are from each of 
the South and the Northeast, and the remaining 6 percent are foreign.
10 
Table 2a shows how game outcomes – the scores, the tendency to play “foe,” and 
individuals’ winnings – vary by player gender, age, and race.  Table 2b shows how play varies with 
both own and opponent characteristics.  We discuss these tables below. 
 
V.  Results 
In this section we examine 1) how learning affects coordination, 2) how stakes affect play, 
and 3) how contributions affect play. 
 
A.  Learning to Coordinate 
1.  Learning from Season One 
In Season 1, the tendency to play cooperatively differs across player demographics.  Men 
play foe more often than women (52.5 percent vs. 46.3 percent), although this difference is not 
statistically significant (two-sided p-value=0.34).  Players under the median age (<=27) choose 
“foe” more often than players over the median (64.6 vs. 38.9 percent, two-sided p-value<0.01), and 
blacks play foe more often than whites (57.5 vs. 48.1 percent, two-sided p-value=0.33).  Column 
(3) of table 3 reports a bivariate probit of  both players’ tendencies to play “foe” on their own 
characteristics in Season 1.    The pairwise differences appear here as well, again with low levels of 
statistical significance.  Yet, we resoundingly reject the hypothesis that a players’ own 
characteristics are unrelated to his or her play (p-value=0.0005). 
One thing that Season 1 play does not depend on is an opponent’s characteristics.  When we 
include both own and opponent characteristics in the bivariate probit for Season 1 play – see 
                                                 
10 One can infer from context – show banter – that “hometown” refers to upbringing rather than current residence.   17
column (5) – we continue to reject the hypothesis that own characteristics do not matter (p-
value=0.0005), but we cannot reject the hypothesis that opponent characteristics do not matter (p-
value=0.96). 
These results support our assumption that we can draw inferences about types’ (G, S) 
distributions from Season 1 play.  A player familiar with Season 1 would come away with the 
expectation that women have more “conscience” than men – that is, a (G,S) distribution that, for a 
given set of beliefs about opponent play inclines them to play “friend” with higher frequency – and 
that older players have more such “conscience” than younger players.
11   We – and Season 2 
players – can use these inferences to make predictions about play in Season 2. 
 
2.  Coordination in Season Two 
What sort of Season 2 play do we expect to see in our data?  First, the overall “foe” rate 
should increase.  Second, cooperative players should play “foe” at lower rates against other 
cooperative players than they do against less cooperative players.  As a result, we should see as a 
third implication that the amount of coordinated play should increase. 
Our data bear out these predictions.  First, as table 2a shows, the individual “foe” rate jumps 
from 49 to 58 percent between Season 1 and Season 2 (two-sided p-value=0.03).  The “foe” rate 
does not increase across the board, however.  Instead, we see the clear emergence of conditional 
cooperation: predictably cooperative types are less likely to play “foe” against other predictably 
cooperative types than against predictably less-cooperative opponents. We can examine this by 
gender, age, and race.   
                                                 
11 Blacks play foe more often than whites, but this has to be understood in light of the fact blacks never play against 
other blacks.  Hence, black foe rates could simply reflect a high expectation that whites will play foe against them.   18
In Season 1 men play “foe” 52 percent of the time when playing against men and a 
statistically indistinguishable 54 percent of the time when playing against women.  Similarly, in 
Season 1, women play statistically indistinguishable “foe” rates against men (48 percent) and 
women (44 percent).  In Season 2, however, “foe” rates depend on both own and partner gender.  
Men and women both play “foe” over 60 percent against men, and men play “foe” 58 percent of the 
time against women.  Yet, women play “foe” only 45 percent of the time against women.  We 
cannot reject the hypothesis that men play the same against men and women in Season 2, but we 
can reject the hypothesis that women play the same against both men and women (p-value=0.007, 
two-sided).  See figure 3a. 
Results by race combination are similar.  In Season 1 blacks play “foe” 58 percent of the 
time, while whites play “foe” 48 percent, and the “foe” rate for whites differs indistinguishably in 
Season 1 depending on whether they are playing against whites (51 percent) or blacks (47 percent).  
In Season 2, by contrast, the “foe” rate is roughly three quarters for whites playing against blacks 
and for blacks playing against whites, but it is only 53 percent – and statistically significantly lower 
– for whites playing against whites (p-value=0.03, two sided).   See figure 3b. 
There is additional evidence along these lines by age.  Young players play “foe” nearly two 
thirds of the time in Season 1, while older players play “foe” only 39 percent of the time, and this 
difference is significant.  In Season 2, the “foe” rate if either player is young averages 60 percent, 
and one cannot reject the hypothesis that it is equal across young-young, old-young, and young-old 
pairs.   Compared to this, the “foe” rate for older players against older players is only 50 percent, 
although it is not statistically significantly lower than their rate against younger players in Season 2 
(p-value=0.20, two-sided).   19
Coordinated play increases in Season 2.  As table 4 shows, the fraction of games with 
outcomes on the main diagonal increases from 49 to 57 percent (two-sided p-value=0.15).  We can 
also document this in the context of bivariate probit models of the players’ “foe” decisions, as 
shown in table 3.  The first two columns include only constant terms.  The r parameter, the 
correlation of players’ foe-playing tendencies not explained by observables, reflects de facto 
coordination and is insignificantly different from 0 in Season 1.  In the second Season its estimated 
value is 0.22 (p-value=0.057), reflecting greater coordination.   Columns (3) and (4) include 
specifications with players’ own observable characteristics.   Players’ own characteristics affect 
their play in both seasons.  With players’ own observables included, r remains zero in Season 1 
and is estimated to be 0.17 (s.e.=0.12) in Season 2.  
We suspect that increased coordination in Season 2, if it is based on updating of beliefs 
based on Season 1, is driven by both variables that we can observe (and record) as well as factors 
that the players observe but are not in the data.  Accordingly, we can ask how much of the 
increased coordination of play is attributable to our simple characterization of observables. We 
examine this by including own and opponent observables in the bivariate probit models.  Columns 
(5) and (6) report bivariate probits including both own and opponent characteristics as determinants 
of play.  The r parameter remains essentially zero in Season 1, and there is no evidence that 
opponent characteristics affect own play in Season 1. In Season 2, however, there is evidence that 
own play is related to opponent characteristics.  With own and opponent observables included, the 
r parameter estimate declines somewhat to 0.15 (s.e.=0.13), suggesting that our additive 
observables explain some of the increase in coordination between seasons. 
We can revisit the question of how conditional cooperation emerges by including variables 
indicating whether both players have observable characteristics associated with conditional   20
cooperation.  The last two columns include variables for whether players are both female, both old, 
or both white.  “Both female” and “both white” are negative and significant in Season 2 but not in 
Season 1, affirming the emergence of conditional cooperation in Season 2 suggested in figure 3. 
3.  Coordination and Winnings 
 
From the standpoint of money winnings, coordination is not necessarily beneficial.  If half 
of players are cooperative by nature, but they have the uninformed beliefs about opponents 
described earlier (c.f. section III.A.), then players will arrive at “foe-foe” – with no winnings for 
either player – only one quarter of the time.  With perfect information, by contrast, there are no 
winnings for either player three quarters of the time.  In the context of this game, information only 
helps those who are expected to be conditionally cooperative, and then only when they are paired 
with expected conditional cooperators.  If we denote the probability that a contestant plays “foe” as 
p, and we normalize stakes to 1, then total expected winnings when play is independent are 1-p
2, 
while expected winnings with fully informed players are (1-p)
2.  Information reduces winnings 
regardless of p, and the decline is larger as p is larger.   
What happens between seasons?   Because the “foe-foe” rate increases, winnings decline 
even in relation to an overall decline in game stakes between seasons.  As table 2a shows, in 
Season 1 players score an average of $3718 and take home an average of 39 percent ($1463).  In 
Season 2 scores average $3062, and players take home an average of 30 percent.
12 
The ratio declines differently across groups.  In particular, it declines less for pairs of 
expected conditional cooperators.  For pairs of women, whites, and older players collectively, the 
average winnings ratio declines from 39 to 32 percent.  For the remainder of the sample, it declines 
                                                 
12 One can alternatively calculate the average of each individual’s take ratio (winnings/score) to arrive at 38.3 in season 
1 and 31.9 in season 2.    21
from 43 to 22 percent.  Two-women teams appear to solve the coordination problem differently 
than others.  In Season 2 they have the highest “friend-friend” rate and the lowest “foe-foe” rate.  
As a result of the latter, women playing women have the highest “take” rate among all groups in 
Season 2.  In essence, women have established an “island of cooperation” in Season 2, at least 
relative to other players. 
 
B.  Do Stakes Matter? 
While it is generally prohibitively expensive to run high-stakes experiments, a number of 
investigators have run experiments in low-income countries, where it is possible to give high stakes 
by local standards (for a survey, see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).   Translated to current US 
dollars, the highest stakes in these games seem to be about $500.  The conclusion of this literature 
is that stake variation over this range does not affect behavior, allaying some of the concern that 
prior results for low-stakes does not generalize.  Yet, two worries remain.  First, experiments run in 
different countries tend to give different results, with stakes constant (see Roth, et al. (1991)).  
Hence, the high-stakes behavior of Slovak or Indonesian subjects may not generalize to US 
persons.  Second, even though behavior does not change as stakes vary from a few dollars to, say, 
$500, behavior may change if stakes rise by another order of magnitude. 
The data in our study allow us to revisit the question of how stakes affect play. The team 
score – based on the number of questions they answer correctly – determines the stakes of the 
Friend or Foe game they play. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between stakes and the tendency to play foe.  Each circle in 
the diagram shows the relative frequency of  “foe” play for all players with a particular score.  The 
horizontal axis shows the logarithm of scores.  Circle size reflects the number of persons with each   22
score.  The leftmost circle indicates a 39 percent “foe” rate for the 36 individuals who play with 
$200 at stake.  Other than a depressed “foe” rate with $200 at stake, there is no apparent 
relationship between stakes and the individual tendency to play foe. 
Figure 5 reports the “foe”-stakes relationship for players eliminated in the first round of 
each episode.  These scores can vary between $200 and $2200, depending on whether the team gets 
0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 questions right.  In order to exit the game in the first round a team must have the 
lowest score, and the highest score observed for these teams is $1700.
13  Figure 2 vividly indicates 
that the “foe” rate is lower for $200 games (for losers in round 1); the figure also shows an 
oscillating pattern (low for $200, high for $500 and $700 stakes, lower for $1000 and $1200, then 
higher again for $1500 and $1700).
14     
Figure 6 breaks down the individual foe-stakes relationship by season.  Although the graphs 
reveal no unconditional relationships between stakes and the individual tendency to play “foe,” we 
can explore the relationship further with regressions that account for players’ characteristics along 
with the game’s stakes.  Table 5 presents four groups of probit estimates of the individual “foe” 
rate on stakes, with and without explanatory covariates.  Each group of three uses data from a) the 
full sample, b) Season 1 only, and c) Season 2 only.  The first group of four includes play from all 
rounds of the game and no covariates.  The second group of three includes only the play of teams 
losing in the first round.  These groups repeat in columns 7-12, with covariates for age, gender, 
race, and region.  Standard errors in all regressions are clustered on the pair to account for the 
possible dependence of opponents’ play. 
                                                 
13 Recall that teams are spotted $200 prior to the game in the first season, so that first season scores are $200, 700, 
1200, etc, while second season scores are $200, 500, 1000, etc. 
14 The oscillation suggests a possible explanatory role for relative contributions.  When $200 is at stake, neither player 
has contributed a correct answer, whereas when $500 or $700 is at stake, only one of the two players has contributed a 
correct answer (unless their answers were truly simultaneous).  We explore this further below. 
   23
The foe-stakes relationship is not statistically significant in any of the 12 specifications in 
table 5, although it has borderline significance in the Season 2 regressions using round 1 play 
(columns 6 and 12).  Some observables are generally significant: age bears a generally negative 
relationship with the tendency to play “foe” (particularly in Season 1 regressions), and westerners 
are more likely to play foe. 
In addition to the relationship between stakes and individual “foe” rates, we can also 
explore the relationship between stakes and the tendency for cooperative – and coordinated – pair 
outcomes.  Table 6 reports probit estimates of 3 mutually exclusive pair outcomes (foe-foe, friend-
friend, and split) on log stakes along with controls for the demographic composition of the pairs, by 
season.  Stakes are not significant in any of the equations. 
Except for the teams facing stakes of $200 – who are slightly more likely to play  “friend” – 
there is no evidence that stakes affect cooperativeness, either within or across rounds of the game.  
The difference between the “foe” rate at $200 stakes and higher stakes suggests a possibility that 
stakes matter only at that lower bound, although this difference could also be due to an effect of 
answering no questions correctly, independent of stakes. 
These issues aside, what is remarkable about our data is that even with very large sums of 
money at stake, the “foe” rate remains stable and does not increase above 55 percent.  If we are 
correct to conjecture that players understand the game, then these deviations from the (weakly) 
dominant strategy in the money payoff game are not due to cognitive limitations.  Rather, the 
observed patterns of play must reflect non-monetary payoffs that are differ substantially from the 
money payoffs.  In particular, since a player chooses “foe” if and only if Gi – Si · ? i   >   x / 2, and 
this occurs with a 55 percent frequency regardless of x, it must be the case that the 55
th percentile of    24
Gi – Si · ? i  is proportional to x.  Non-monetary concerns appear to scale up roughly linearly with 
the monetary gains at stake. 
 
C.  Do Contributions Affect Play? 
Each team member contributes differently to the kitty during the production phase of the 
game, and the tendency to play “foe” may depend the number of questions correctly answered.  We 
record the number of questions that each player answers – correctly and incorrectly – in each 
round, and we use this to create measures of the number of correct and incorrect answers 
contributed by each team member along with their dollar-value analogues.  For the dollar 
analogues, we weight questions by $500 for rounds 1 and round 3, and by $1000 for round 2. 
Table 7 presents a first look at these data.  The top panel divides the sample according to 
whether the difference between the net contribution of player 1 less the net contribution of player 2 
is above or below the median for this gap.  Each player’s net contribution in questions is the 
number of correct answers less the number of incorrect answers that he contributes.  The average 
above-median net question contribution is about 2.5, while the average below-median net question 
contribution is about 0.   In Season 1, players above the median in terms of net question 
contribution are more likely to play “foe” (two-sided p-value = 0.091).   There is no statistically 
discernible difference in Season 2. 
The second panel of the table revisits the question with dollar-weighted net contributions, 
and the results are similar.  The average above-median net contribution is about $1400, while the 
average below-median net contribution is zero or negative.  Again, players with above-median 
dollar-weighted contributions are more likely than others to play “foe” in Season 1 but not in 
Season 2.     25
Table 8 examines this question in a series of regressions.  Each regression includes team 
fixed effects.  The first two columns include the numbers of correct and incorrect answers 
separately, by season.  Columns (3) and (4) include the net questions (correct – incorrect).  
Columns (5)-(8) revisit the question with dollar-weighted answers.  The only individually 
significant variable in the table is the (raw or dollar-weighted) number of correct answers in Season 
1 (see columns (1) and (5)).   That is, there is evidence of reciprocity in Season 1: the player 
contributing fewer correct answers to the team is more likely than his opponent to play friend.  
When we divide the sample into high and low stakes groups, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
contributions have the same effect on playing “foe” across stakes. 
The results beg two questions.  First, why do negative contributions have no effect on play?   
Based on watching the show, we speculate that negative contributions do not affect play because 
many wrong answers do not harm the team.  Most negative contributions occur when neither player 
knows the answer.  Second, why is there no evidence of reciprocity in Season 2?   Given our 
evidence on learning, players in Season 2 have much better predictions of their opponents’ likely 
play than they did in Season 1.  Perhaps what they have learned swamps reciprocity.    
We note here that the inclusion of contribution variables in unreported foe-rate regressions 
does not change the stake invariance reported above.  
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Our study has a number of interesting findings.  First, we have documented that players 
learn from the history experienced by other players.  In particular, they learn how players of 
various types are expected to play, and what they learn facilitates conditional cooperation.  In 
Season 2, cooperative individuals play “friend” at elevated rates but only when paired with other   26
cooperative types.  While better-informed players tend to bring about smaller dollar winnings, 
more cooperative types of players, such as women and older contestants, can create “island of 
cooperation” where winnings decline considerably less. 
Second, we document that even very high stakes don’t induce Nash play.  This indicates 
that the non-monetary payoffs associated with disutility of asymmetric (or inequitable) outcomes 
are large and proportional to dollar stakes.  If these sorts of payoffs, which are well-documented in 
small-stakes laboratory experiments, generalize to other contexts, then one may infer that 
cooperation can arise without the usual suspects of repeat play or extra-game sanctions. 
Finally, we document reciprocity, at least in the first season of play.  Players contributing 
fewer correct answers are more likely than their opponents to play friend.  This behavior disappears 
in the second season, perhaps because player’s ability to predict their opponents’ play creates 
incentives that swamp the desire to reciprocate.   27
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Figure 6: Stakes and the Individual “foe” Rate by Season   33
 
 
Table 1: Contestant Characteristics 
 
group  Number  percent 
All  630  100 
     
Male  314  50.1 
Female  313  49.9 
     
Foreign  38  6.3 
North Central  103  17.2 
Northeast  80  13.3 
South  92  15.3 
West  287  47.8 
     
Black  95  15.8 
White  470  78.3 
Other  35  5.8 
     
Mean age  29.1   
25
th pct  23   
median  27   
75
th pct  33   
   34
Table 2a: Individual Outcomes by Group and Season 
Group  season  Foe  N  Stakes  Winnings 
Mean Winnings/ 
Mean Stakes 
All  Total  54.8%  630  3314.1  1130.6  34.12% 
  1  49.2%  240  3718.3  1462.9  39.34% 
  2  58.2%  390  3062.7  926.2  30.24% 
Men  Total  56.5%  313  3637.8  1207.5 
 
33.2% 
  1  52.5%  118  4330.5  1847.5  42.7% 
  2  59.0%  195  3216.5  820.3  25.5% 
Women  Total  53.2%  314  2990.1  1054.9 
 
35.3% 
  1  46.3%  121  3100.8  1074.4  34.6% 
  2  57.5%  193  2919.9  1042.7  35.7% 
White  Total  54.3%  470  3501.1  1201.1 
 
34.3% 
  1  48.1%  183  3915.3  1388.5  35.5% 
  2  58.2%  287  3236.9  1081.5  33.4% 
Black  Total  65.3%  95  2840.0  856.8 
 
30.2% 
  1  57.5%  40  2912.5  1528.8  52.5% 
  2  70.9%  55  2787.3  368.2  13.2% 
Other Race  Total  48.6%  35  2620.0  931.4 
 
35.6% 
  1  45.5%  11  3563.6  2340.9  65.7% 
  2  50.0%  24  2187.5  285.4  13.0% 
Young (<=27)  Total  61.3%  310  3444.8  1205.0 
 
35.0% 
  1  64.6%  96  3686.5  1665.1  45.2% 
  2  59.8%  214  3336.4  998.6  29.9% 
Old (> 27)  Total  48.4%  320  3185.8  1058.6 
 
33.2% 
  1  38.9%  144  3739.6  1328.1  35.5% 
  2  56.3%  176  2722.1  838.1  30.8%   35
Table 2b: Individual Outcomes, by Own and Partner Characteristics 
  season  Foe  N  Stakes  Winnings 
Mean Winnings/ 
Mean Stakes 
Male vs Male  1 52.1%  48  5541.7  2291.7  41.4% 
  2 60.7%  84  3576.2  1234.5  34.5% 
  Total  57.6%  132  4290.9  1618.9  37.7% 
             
Male vs Female  1 53.6%  69  3460.9  1520.3  43.9% 
  2 57.7%  111  2941.8  506.8  17.2% 
  Total  56.1%  180  3141.9  895.3  28.5% 
             
Female vs Male  1 47.8%  69  3460.9  1023.2  29.6% 
  2 65.8%  111  2941.8  963.5  32.8% 
  Total  58.9%  180  3141.9  986.4  31.4% 
             
 
Female vs Female  1 44.2%  52  2623.1  1142.3  43.5% 
  2 45.0%  80  2920.0  1172.5  40.2% 
  Total  44.7%  132  2803.0  1160.6  41.4% 
             
White vs. White  1 51.5%  136  4225.0  1542.6  36.5% 
  2 53.1%  226  3314.2  1115.0  33.6% 
  Total  52.5%  362  3656.4  1275.7  34.9% 
             
White vs. Black  1 45.9%  37  2929.7  833.8  28.5% 
  2 74.5%  47  2859.6  786.2  27.5% 
  Total  61.9%  84  2890.5  807.1  27.9% 
             
Black vs White  1 56.8%  37  2929.7  1652.7  56.4% 
  2 70.2%  47  2859.6  350.0  12.2% 
  Total  64.3%  84  2890.5  923.8  32.0% 
             
Young vs Young  1 65.6%  32  3512.5  940.6  26.8% 
  2 60.0%  120  3671.7  1163.3  31.7% 
  Total  61.2%  152  3638.2  1116.4  30.7% 
             
Young vs Old  1 64.1%  64  3773.4  2027.3  53.7% 
  2 59.6%  94  2908.5  788.3  27.1% 
  Total  61.4%  158  3258.9  1290.2  39.6% 
             
Old vs Young  1 37.5%  64  3773.4  1041.4  27.6% 
  2 61.7%  94  2908.5  862.8  29.7% 
  Total  51.9%  158  3258.9  935.1  28.7% 
             
Old vs Old  1 40.0%  80  3712.5  1557.5  42.0% 
  2 50.0%  82  2497.4  809.8  32.4% 
  Total  45.1%  162  3112.7  1179.0  37.9%   36
Table 3: Play and Own and Opponent Characteristics 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Season:  1  2  1  2  1  2  1  2 
















































   




































   














































don’t matter  
(p-val) 

















   
H0: Interaction of 
pair characteristics 
don’t matter  
(p-val) 






N (pairs)  120  195  117  183  117  183  117  183 
 
Note: bivariate probit models of player pairs’ “foe” decisions.   37
Table 4: Pair Outcomes 
    Coordination     
   Season  Foe-Foe  Friend-Friend  Total  Split 
Friend-
Friend/Total 
Coord.  N 
All  1  23.9%  24.8%  48.7%  51.3%  50.9%  117 
  2  36.4%  20.7%  57.1%  42.9%  36.3%  198 
  Total  31.7%  22.2%  54.0%  46.0%  41.2%  315 
               
2 Female  1  15.4%  26.9%  42.3%  57.7%  63.6%  26 
  2  25.0%  35.0%  60.0%  40.0%  58.3%  40 
  Total  21.2%  31.8%  53.0%  47.0%  60.0%  66 
               
1 Male, 1 Female  1  28.4%  26.9%  55.2%  44.8%  48.6%  67 
  2  41.6%  18.6%  60.2%  39.8%  30.9%  113 
  Total  36.7%  21.7%  58.3%  41.7%  37.1%  180 
               
2 Male  1  20.8%  16.7%  37.5%  62.5%  44.4%  24 
  2  33.3%  11.9%  45.2%  54.8%  26.3%  42 
  Total  28.8%  13.6%  42.4%  57.6%  32.1%  66 
               
2 Young  1  50.0%  18.8%  68.8%  31.3%  27.3%  16 
  2  40.0%  20.0%  60.0%  40.0%  33.3%  60 
  Total  42.1%  19.7%  61.8%  38.2%  31.9%  76 
               
1 Young, 1 Old  1  20.3%  18.8%  39.1%  60.9%  48.0%  64 
  2  40.4%  19.1%  59.6%  40.4%  32.1%  94 
  Total  32.3%  19.0%  51.3%  48.7%  37.0%  158 
               
2 Old  1  18.9%  37.8%  56.8%  43.2%  66.7%  37 
  2  27.6%  17.2%  44.8%  55.2%  38.5%  29 
  Total  22.7%  28.8%  51.5%  48.5%  55.9%  66 
               
2 White  1  25.6%  29.5%  55.1%  44.9%  53.5%  78 
  2  31.9%  25.7%  57.6%  42.4%  44.6%  144 
  Total  29.7%  27.0%  56.8%  43.2%  47.6%  222 
               
1 White, 1 Black  1  20.5%  15.4%  35.9%  64.1%  42.9%  39 
  2  48.1%  7.4%  55.6%  44.4%  13.3%  54 
   Total  36.6%  10.8%  47.3%  52.7%  22.7%  93 
  Table 5: Individual Foe Rates and Stakes 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  full  Season 1  Season 2  full  Season 1  Season 2  full  Season 1  Season 2  full  Season 1  Season 2 
Log Score  0.0015  -0.0335  0.0426  0.1172  0.1780  0.1717  0.0049  -0.0492  0.0554  0.1624  0.2208  0.2094 
  (0.0487)  (0.0748)  (0.0637)  (0.1310)  (0.1727)  (0.1880)  (0.0500)  (0.0820)  (0.0647)  (0.1330)  (0.1751)  (0.1904) 
Age              -0.0207  -0.0404  -0.0003  -0.0184  -0.0249  -0.0130 
              (0.0065)**  (0.0113)**  (0.0082)  (0.0102)  (0.0180)  (0.0123) 
Black              0.3468  0.3312  0.3698  0.3112  0.4306  0.3105 
              (0.1514)*  (0.2438)  (0.2012)  (0.2455)  (0.3961)  (0.3248) 
Male              0.1642  0.2163  0.0938  0.1349  -0.1400  0.2395 
              (0.0992)  (0.1569)  (0.1331)  (0.1864)  (0.2949)  (0.2459) 
West              0.3474  0.2294  0.4497  0.2832  0.2604  0.3405 
              (0.1052)**  (0.1828)  (0.1279)**  (0.1815)  (0.3025)  (0.2279) 
Constant  0.1313  0.2510  -0.0798  -0.6251  -1.1815  -0.8682  0.4099  1.3610  -0.4854  -0.6215  -0.8368  -1.0636 
  (0.3738)  (0.5862)  (0.4819)  (0.8306)  (1.1004)  (1.1713)  (0.4416)  (0.7386)  (0.5647)  (0.8886)  (1.1974)  (1.2427) 
Observations  600  234  366  200  78  122  600  234  366  200  78  122 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.                   1
Table 6: Pair Outcomes and Stakes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Friend-Friend 
Season 1 






Foe –Foe  
Season 2 
Split Outcome  
Season 2 
Log Score  0.0301  -0.0037  -0.0265  0.0033  0.0320  -0.0353 
  (0.0408)  (0.0397)  (0.0459)  (0.0266)  (0.0331)  (0.0341) 
Man and 
Woman 
0.0305  0.0992  -0.1297  -0.1823  0.1677  0.0146 
  (0.1017)  (0.0989)  (0.1144)  (0.0736)*  (0.0917)  (0.0943) 
2 Men  -0.1015  0.0540  0.0475  -0.2228  0.0356  0.1872 
  (0.1279)  (0.1243)  (0.1438)  (0.0888)*  (0.1107)  (0.1139) 
Black and 
White 
-0.1335  -0.1033  0.2369  -0.1639  0.1412  0.0226 
  (0.0863)  (0.0839)  (0.0970)*  (0.0634)*  (0.0790)  (0.0813) 
2 Blacks  -0.2507  0.7421  -0.4914  -0.1876  0.6731  -0.4855 
  (0.4366)  (0.4243)  (0.4908)  (0.3931)  (0.4902)  (0.5040) 
Old and Young  0.0067  -0.3081  0.3014  0.0177  -0.0084  -0.0093 
  (0.1218)  (0.1184)*  (0.1369)*  (0.0644)  (0.0803)  (0.0826) 
2 Old  0.1824  -0.3065  0.1242  -0.0268  -0.1226  0.1494 
  (0.1302)  (0.1266)*  (0.1464)  (0.0879)  (0.1096)  (0.1127) 
Constant  -0.0001  0.4926  0.5075  0.3636  0.0164  0.6200 
  (0.3388)  (0.3293)  (0.3809)  (0.2144)  (0.2673)  (0.2749)* 
Observations  117  117  117  183  183  183 
R-squared  0.08  0.11  0.13  0.08  0.06  0.04 
Notes: Probit estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             2
Table 7: Relative Contributions and the Foe Rate 
 
A. Questions 
  Player 2 Makes Larger Net 
Contribution (Questions) 
Player 1 Makes Larger Net 
Contribution (Questions) 
Season 1  Contribution  Foe rate  Contribution  Foe rate 
Player 1  0.05  43.3%  2.46  60.9% 
Player 2  2.45  50.7%  0.04  46.0% 
N  67    50   
Season 2         
Player 1  -0.65  62.9%  1.94  68.7% 
Player 2  1.14  48.3%  -0.96  64.2% 
N  116    67   
 
B. Dollars 
  Player 2 Makes Larger Net 
Contribution (Dollars) 
Player 1 Makes Larger Net 
Contribution (Dollars) 
Season 1  Contribution  Foe rate  Contribution  Foe rate 
Player 1  56.34     45.1%     1358.7     58.7%          
Player 2  1563.4    54.9%     -250.0     39.1%    
N  71    46   
Season 2         
Player 1  -509.1  62.7%  1068.5  68.5% 
Player 2  781.8  48.2%  -787.7  63.0% 
N         
   3
 
Table 8: Contributions and the Tendency to Play Foe, by Season 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Foe  Foe  Foe  Foe  Foe  Foe  Foe  Foe 
  Season 1  Season 2  Season 1  Season 2  Season 1  Season 2  Season 1  Season 2 
# Correct Answers  0.0466  -0.0170             
  (0.0232)*  (0.0192)             
# Incorrect Answers  -0.0085  0.0149             
  (0.0328)  (0.0245)             
# Net Correct Answers      0.0358  -0.0163         
      (0.0210)  (0.0163)         
$ Correct Answers          0.06836  -0.03635     
          (0.03542)  (0.02984)     
$ Incorrect Answers          0.00353  0.02072     
          (0.05063)  (0.003313)     
$ Net Correct Answers              0.04781  -0.02948 
              (0.03179)  (0.002360) 
Constant  0.3627  0.6064  0.4510  0.6011  0.3526  0.6248  0.4618  0.59970 
  (0.0917)**  (0.0736)**  (0.0420)**  (0.0247)**  (0.0929)**  (0.0710)**  (0.0399)**  (0.0243)** 
Observations  234  366  234  366  234  366  234  366 
Number of pair  117  183  117  183  117  183  117  183 
R-squared  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01 
Notes: Dependent variable is foe dummy.  All regressions include pair fixed effects.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 